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Academic scholars have leveraged crowd work 
platforms such as MTurk to conduct research and 
collect data. Though prior studies have discussed data 
quality and validity issues in crowd work via surveys 
and experiments, they kind of neglected to explore the 
scholars’ and particularly the IRB’s ethical concerns 
in these respects. In this study, we interviewed 17 
scholars from six disciplines and 15 IRB directors and 
analysts in the U.S. to fill this research gap. We 
identified common themes among our respondents but 
also discovered distinctive and even opposing views 
regarding the approval rate, rejection, internal and 
external research validity. Based on the findings, we 
discussed a potential Tragedy of the Commons 
regarding the data quality deterioration and the 
disciplinary differences regarding validity in crowd 
work-based research. Finally, we advocated that the 
IRB’s ethical concerns in crowd work-based research 
should be heard and respected further.    
1. Introduction  
Crowd work is a social, technical, and economic 
mode of production that harnesses collective 
intelligence from an undefined network of people 
[1,2] . Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is the most 
popular and well-known crowd work platform since its 
public launch in 2005. For over a decade, scholars in 
different disciplines from computer science to 
psychology have been leveraging crowd work 
platforms, particularly MTurk, to recruit participants 
and collect data for various research purposes, such as 
photo tagging, audio transcription, surveys, and 
experiments. In this paper, we call this type of 
academic research crowd work-based research. 
Previously, scholars have termed it more broadly as 
crowdsourcing research [3], the crowdsourcing model 
of research [4], or crowdsourced research [5]. We 
prefer a narrow term since crowdsourcing does not 
necessarily include a monetary incentive as research 
compensation. We refer to the academic research on 
MTurk as the epic representation of crowd work-based 
research because to date, MTurk is still the most 
popular crowd work platform for scholars [2,6] even 
though Prolific has obtained growing attention and 
traction in academia [7,8]. 
Crowd work-based research is popular for three 
main reasons. First, a crowd work platform is fast and 
convenient for scholars to recruit from a diverse 
population of crowd workers around the globe, almost 
without any time or geographical limit [9]. Second, a 
crowd work platform provides relatively affordable 
samples for scholars [10,11], particularly before any 
“minimum wage” was popularized as a rule of thumb 
for crowd work-based research compensation. Third, 
since MTurk’s inception, many scholars have argued 
and defended that the data quality and validity in 
crowd work-based research are comparable or even 
superior to similar research conducted on the other 
venues [10,12,13]. This third merit of crowd work-
based research is controversial because some scholars 
have also observed frequent cheaters on crowd work 
platforms on MTurk and  Prolific [14,15]. We also had 
conducted crowd work-based research but still had 
some ethical concerns and doubts about crowd work 
platforms’ “merits.” However, we found little prior 
research about the ethical issues with data quality and 
validity in crowd work-based research from the 
scholars’ and the IRB’s perspectives. Hence, to fill this 
research gap, we conducted 32 semi-structured in-
depth interviews with both scholars and IRB directors 
and analysts who were experienced in conducting and 
reviewing crowd work-based research to probe their 
ethical perceptions and practices.  
We summarized the following themes from our 
research findings regarding data quality and validity in 
crowd work-based research. First, most scholars did 
not want to bother or waste their time arguing with 
crowd workers about data quality issues in their task 
submission. Some scholars in our interviews would 
approve crowd workers unconditionally even though 
they knew that some crowd workers were cheating or 
spamming. Only one scholar raised his concern about 
the consequence if every scholar avoided rejecting 
crowd workers. Second, two scholars from different 
research disciplines held contrasting views of data 
validity in crowd work-based research, particularly 
between internal and external validity. Third, the IRB 






directors and analysts in our interviews usually held a 
suspicious if not critical attitude toward data quality 
and validity issues in crowd work-based research. 
Some of them expressed a resignation that crowd 
work-based research had been so popular and 
powerful in academia that their ethical concerns would 
not impact scholars’ flocking to this trend. One IRB 
director even felt threatened when he helped the 
scholars in his institution to negotiate with some 
crowd workers about their data quality and rejection. 
Based on these findings, we conducted a critical 
analysis. First, echoing one scholar’s perspective 
during our interview, we argue that it becomes a 
“Tragedy of the Commons” for all the scholars in 
crowd work-based research if every scholar continues 
to avoid rejecting any crowd workers with cheating 
behaviors. Because consequently, no crowd worker 
needs to care about their data quality, and the 
ecosystem of crowd work-based research will 
collapse. Second, we argue that the validity of crowd 
work-based research should not be cross-referenced 
between different research disciplines or focused only 
on a crowd work platform such as MTurk. Instead, the 
validity of crowd work-based research should be 
assessed with a research discipline’s particular 
characteristics or expectations. Finally, we argue that 
the IRB’s ethical concerns in crowd work-based 
research should be voiced and respected. We felt that 
many IRB directors and analysts were in an 
embarrassing or even inferior position. Their ethical 
doubts or critiques of crowd work-based research had 
little influence on many scholars’ favor of recruiting 
crowd workers. Also, they had to help scholars deal 
with “aggressive” complaints and menace from a few 
crowd workers, as one IRB director put it.  
Our study contributes to the crowdsourcing and 
digital workforce in the gig economy minitrack as 
follows. First, both ethics and crowd work-based 
research are popular and prominent topics in academia 
but have not been cross-investigated extensively in 
HICSS and beyond. Our study paves a path into this 
merging and underdeveloped research area. Second, 
existing scholarship lacks an exploration from the 
IRB’s perspectives about data and validity issues in 
crowd work-based research. Our study is a pioneering 
effort to uncover their perceptions and practices. 
Third, our study provided multiple comparative lenses 
into crowd work-based research ethics between 
scholars in different research disciplines and between 
scholars and IRBs. Finally, prior research on ethics in 
the gig economy focused primarily on the digital 
workforce’s vulnerability. However, our study took an 
alternative view and identified a Tragedy of Commons 
for scholars doing crowd work-based research if they 
continue to refuse or avoid rejecting unaccountable 
crowd workers that provide poor quality data.  
2. Related Work 
2.1. Data quality issues in crowd work 
Data quality issues have been in concern and 
dispute since the nascence of crowd work. Many 
scholars in various research disciplines have claimed 
that the data collected from crowd workers were of 
comparable and even superior quality to that from the 
other venues [10,12,13,16]. Nonetheless, some 
scholars also observed that crowd workers would 
deliberately cheat in their responses [14] or use virtual 
private servers (VPS) to conceal their real IP address 
to take tasks [17] and even use automatic scripts to 
answer surveys [18]. Due to these paradoxical 
findings, research is ongoing about what factors 
impact data quality in crowd work. Scholars have 
analyzed the correlation between the monetary 
incentive and data quality but could not reach a 
consensus. For example, Buhrmester et al. and Mason 
& Watts suggested that increasing the payment rate 
would lead to more contribution quantity but not 
necessarily better data quality from crowd workers 
[16,19]. Yet, Litman et al. and Yin et al. have found it 
otherwise, at least to some specific crowd worker 
populations and types of crowd work tasks [20,21].  
Scholars also investigated the data quality 
variance related to crowd workers’ reputations and 
crowd work fairness. For example, Peer et al. found 
that the worker’s reputation is a sufficient condition 
for their data quality, and those with high approval 
rates tend to provide high-quality input [22]. More 
recently, however, Lovett et al. revealed that some 
MTurk workers with high approval rates confessed 
that they did not always provide reliable data [23]. In 
addition, Whiting et al. argued that it would be 
inherently inappropriate to associate crowd workers’ 
reputation with their input quality because crowd 
workers are distributed and decentralized, who 
undercut accountable behaviors and institutions that 
are essential to work quality [24]. Thus, Whiting et al. 
proposed a worker-led reputation prototype to 
facilitate peer-review among crowd workers to 
produce quality work [24].  
Moreover, scholars have attributed data quality 
issues to the unfair and unbalanced power dynamics 
between crowd workers and requesters. Specifically, 
they argued that the unfairness and exploitation on 
MTurk had discouraged crowd workers from 
participating and producing good work [25-27]. Some 
scholars proposed migrating MTurk to alternative 
crowd work platforms, most notably Prolific since 
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Prolific exhibits several sampling and fairness 
advantages over MTurk [7,8]. Nonetheless, a recent 
study has disclosed that cheating behaviors and data 
quality issues exist in Prolific as they do on MTurk 
[15]. To summarize, scholars still face ethical 
challenges to ensure data quality while protecting 
crowd workers’ benefit in research. Still, a gap in the 
prior literature is that little do we know about how 
IRBs perceive data quality issues in crowd work-based 
research and how their perceptions compare with 
scholars’ ethical perspectives and practices.  
2.2. Research validity issues in crowd work 
Apart from data quality, scholars also debate the 
validity of leveraging crowd work for academic 
purposes. Research validity can be further divided into 
internal validity and external validity. Internal validity 
means that certain conditions are shown to lead to 
other conditions, and their relationships are not due to 
spurious factors in a specific research context [28]. 
External validity means a study’s findings can be 
generalized to a more extensive research context and 
population [28]. The scholarly debate over the validity 
of crowd work-based research is evident in an 
exemplary “academic fight.” To start, Kees et al. 
published a paper to advocate for MTurk as a valid 
research venue to collect data besides the professional 
panels and student subject pools [13]. Then, Ford 
wrote a comment and critiqued Kees et al.’s advocacy, 
and pointed out that the “spammers and speeders” on 
MTurk would severely ruin the validity of research 
conducted on this platform [29]. Subsequently, Kees 
et al. published another paper rebuking Ford’s critique 
again and argued that spammers and speeders were not 
“unique” to MTurk and could engender a similar level 
of validity problem in the other pools [30].  
More specific into the concerns, some scholars 
were dubious about research validity on MTurk due to 
MTurk workers’ prior knowledge or acquittance with 
frequently asked survey questions and experimental 
manipulations [31,32]. Additionally, some scholars 
were concerned that crowd workers were not as 
attentive to questions as the other research samples, 
such as college students, and crowd workers might not 
represent the segmented populations such as cognitive 
science [33,34]. Although a few scholars had 
compared and claimed that the MTurk population is 
representative and no more biased than the national 
public in the U.S. [35,36]. More recently, Hargittai and 
Shaw’s empirical and comparative study suggested 
that it would be wiser not to claim any generalizability 
based on the data and findings on MTurk [37].  
Despite these prior works about research validity 
issues in crowd work, there are still lacunae in the 
literature. First, there lacks a comparative inquiry with 
scholars in different research disciplines to probe into 
their opinions about the validity of crowd work-based 
research. We wondered whether scholars in different 
research disciplines would have varied perceptions 
and expectations of validity in crowd work-based 
research. Second, prior scholarship largely ignored the 
IRBs’ perspectives in crowd work-based research 
regarding ethical issues with data quality and validity. 
We posited it to be a critical gap because the IRB has 
an essential role in advising and supervising academic 
research design and ethics. Last but not least, as crowd 
work-based research becomes prevalent across many 
disciplines, associated ethical issues are pressing to be 
explored and discussed to hold scholars and IRBs 
conscious and accountable. Thus, we are motivated 
and feel obliged to conduct this explorative study to 
draw more discussion among scholars and IRBs.   
3. Method 
We conducted 32 semi-structured interviews with 
15 scholars and 17 IRB directors and analysts in the 
U.S. to probe their perceptions and practices about the 
ethical issues in crowd work-based research. We 
devised our interview questions from three sources. 
First, since crowd work-based research involves 
human subject participation, we borrowed several 
typical questions in an IRB application template, such 
as what are the most common risks and benefits in 
crowd work-based research. Second, we designed 
questions deriving from the prior literature about 
crowd work-based research, such as how to evaluate 
exploitation and compensation in this context. Finally, 
we added a few new questions after novel themes 
emerged during our interview progress, such as how to 
perceive using a minimum wage standard as the 
compensation benchmark in crowd work-based 
research. The interviews lasted between 45-60 mins 
and were conducted through Skype or phone call. All 
the interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. 
In terms of our samples, the 15 scholars we 
interviewed were from a pool of active and frequently 
cited scholars who publish crowd work-based research 
in top journals and conferences. The 17 IRB directors 
and analysts we interviewed were from a list of all the 
IRB directors and analysts in the top 100 universities 
in the U.S. [38]. Noteworthy that on both camps, our 
recruitment turned out to be challenging and time-
consuming. Both our interviewed scholars and IRB 
respondents were very concerned about protecting 
their privacy and their institution’s privacy. Hence, we 
cannot reveal their detailed demographic information. 





Table 1. The basic information of the participants 
Role Institution/Discipline Number 
IRB Public University (R1) 8 
IRB Private University (R1) 6 
IRB Private University (R2) 2 
IRB College (R1) 1 
Scholar Information/Computer Science 4 
Scholar Psychology 3 
Scholar Engineering 2 
Scholar Business 2 
Scholar Communication 2 
Scholar Political Science 2 
 
Due to the recruiting and scheduling difficulties, 
our interview data collection spanned several months. 
We kept our first round of data analysts, including 
note-taking and transcription, simultaneous with data 
collection, which is a recommended strategy for 
qualitative research [39]. We continued data collection 
until we sensed that the themes had been theoretically 
saturated. Then, after all our interviews had been fully 
transcribed, we conducted a thematic analysis on our 
transcriptions with Atlas.ti following Braun and 
Clarke’s suggested steps [40]. First, we imported the 
interview transcriptions and familiarized ourselves 
with them on Atlas.ti. Second, we coded through all 
the transcriptions and compared them with our notes 
during the interviews. Third, we identified the codes 
and the emerging themes from the codes. Fourth, we 
re-examined our codes and the themes for their 
validity and fit with each other. Fifth, we refined and 
described each theme. Finally, we reviewed all the 
codes and themes and generated a narrative to present 
our findings. Our research design, sampling plan, data 
protection strategies had been approved by IRB. 
4. Findings  
We identified numerous themes about ethical 
issues in crowd work-based research. In the scope of 
this paper, we focus on reporting and reflecting on the 
ethical issues about data quality and validity. 
4.1. Ethical deliberation on data quality  
Data quality is a central ethical consideration 
among our interviewed scholars and IRB 
directors/analysts. First of all, some respondents 
worried about data quality decline due to crowd 
workers scribbling through questions or giving their 
answers without thought. For example, one scholar 
said: 
There is a minority, actually not a minority, that 
can do lots of damage because these people are not 
paying attention to get work done but to maximize 
their payoff for the minimum amount of work. (P28) 
P28 immediately corrected his first thought of only a 
few spamming crowd workers and speculated the 
spammers’ motive to maximize compensation with the 
least amount of effort. However, unlike P28, most 
scholars in our interviews posited that the percentage 
of spammers in crowd work is small, even though 
there has been little empirical research or estimation 
on the approximate percentage of spammers within the 
crowd workers population.  
On the IRB side, many respondents shared with 
the scholars a critical view of spammers among crowd 
workers. Some of them further cast doubt on the 
reliability of levering crowd work for academic 
research. One IRB director said: 
I am not in favor of using MTurk, and I don’t know 
whether the data are reliable. You have people 
there doing it for the money…so are they answering 
the questions, or are they understanding the 
questions? (P13) 
P13 has served in public and private universities, and 
she explicitly told us that she would not recommend 
the researchers in her universities to use MTurk. Her 
primary concern, like P28, was that some crowd 
workers purported to maximize earnings as fast as they 
can and would care little about data quality  
Besides spamming, our respondents worried 
about fraud in crowd work-based research, which 
means that some crowd workers would deceive their 
qualifications and eligibility to participate in tasks 
with specific screening criteria. One scholar told us: 
We have done interviews with MTurk workers in 
India, and a lot of times, they would take on those 
tasks where it was completely about U.S. politics. 
What they would do is that they would imagine that 
they were like a soccer mom in the U.S. and think 
about what she would respond. (P29) 
P29 had interviewed Indian crowd workers’ behaviors 
and habits previously and knew that some of them 
would pretend to be in the U.S. and answer questions 
about U.S. politics. Hence, she did not trust survey 
studies on MTurk since the data quality is susceptible 
to crowd workers’ fraud. Her voice echoed Antin and 
Shaw’s research findings on the U.S. and Indian 
MTurk workers’ self-reporting problems, which also 
revealed social desirability biases [41].  
Additionally, two respondents raised concerns 
about crowd workers’ fraud using scripts or VPS to 
automate their answers. These respondents mentioned 
the “bot crisis” on MTurk, which has also been 
reported as a notable fraud case by Dennis et al. and 
Chmielewski and Kucker recently [17], [42]. One 
scholar, P20, having highlighted the bot crisis, 
proposed to screen MTurk workers with a high 
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approval rate to avoid such data quality crisis: “you 
have to set your approval rate above 95% to avoid the 
bots or something like this.” (P30) 
An approval rate is a crowd worker’s ratio of 
completed tasks that have been approved by previous 
requesters. Screening crowd workers based on their 
approval rate is a common approach to fend data 
quality. Most of our interviewed scholars favored a 
high rate par like 95% to filter crowd workers’ 
eligibility. However, not every scholar agreed with 
setting a fixed high approval rate to screen crowd 
workers. Some considered the popular yet rigid 95% 
approval rate was arbitrary and without sufficient 
empirical test of its validity. For example, one scholar 
said he understood the rationale of applying a 95% 
approval rate, but he was against it ethically: 
Well, I don’t think that the psychology pool has 
good criteria [for screening]; it’s just “Are you at 
the university and are you taking a class, and if so, 
we are thinking that you are appropriate and we 
can generalize to anyone based on what you have 
done.” We see so much data from 18-20-year-old 
without working experience; is that useful? I don’t 
know, and I am concerned about it. (P22) 
He implied that psychology research had no screening 
criterion as an approval rate for students, but he heard 
little criticism about it. By contrast, researchers started 
to set up a specific screening rate for crowd workers, 
so he perceived it to be a double standard.  
Meanwhile, one scholar abandoned using a high 
approval rate and would intentionally apply a “zero” 
or near-zero approval rate to target novice crowd 
workers. He perceived it to be a better strategy for data 
quality:  
This is my own little secret. I like new workers that 
have completed almost no tasks [be]cause they’re 
going to try hard. They’re just like “I better do a 
good job.” And they’re clicking all the stuff, and 
they pay attention at the end. They’re grateful 
whereas somebody who’s taken a thousand surveys 
there, and they’re more likely to know what I’m 
assessing and know what I’m trying to test for. 
They’re more used to all the attention checks, 
whereas a beginner is more likely to try hard. (P27) 
P27 assumed that new crowd workers would try harder 
and be more attentive than seasoned ones because they 
wanted to accrue a good reputation and were still 
unfamiliar with various survey questions and 
experimental treatments. Thus, for him, new crowd 
workers would produce better data quality than 
seasoned ones. However, several IRB respondents 
pointed out the pitfall in recruiting novice crowd 
workers. They worried that “trying too hard” in crowd 
work beginners is a sign of social desirability bias and 
may divert from a researcher’s original recruitment 
plan and expected sample characteristics. 
Apart from using an approval rate, numerous 
scholars proposed inserting attention check questions 
(ACQs) to ensure data quality. They assumed that if 
crowd workers neglected or failed the ACQs, their 
data quality in the other questions would also be 
problematic. Most of our IRB respondents also 
supported using ACQs as judgment or evidence to 
reject crowd workers or respond to their complaints.     
However, to reject or not to reject a crowd worker 
is a difficult question. Scholars in our interviews 
struggled with it. On the one side, they were conscious 
that spamming and fraud would damage their research 
quality and waste their funding. On the other side, they 
did not regard it worthy of their time and stress to 
negotiate with crowd workers over rejection. Hence, 
they would approve all the crowd workers regardless 
of their data quality. One scholar explained: 
There were some cases when it was obvious that 
some workers did not use our plugin, and we had 
ways of tracking whether they did use it, and they 
basically wanted to get paid even though they did 
not use it. So, we sent them an email and said, ok, 
you didn’t use it, so we were not going to pay you. 
Some of these workers mailed us again, and we did 
end up paying them, but it was more to just remove 
the hassle and not wanting to fight. (P29) 
P29’s choice of avoiding hassles with crowd workers 
was prevalent among our interviewed scholars. Such a 
choice could be apprehensible when an IRB director 
described how aggressive a crowd worker’s complaint 
of rejection could be: 
I would say 75% of the complaints were aggressive. 
One that I received last week, he missed an 
attention check, and he said, “I did,” and the 
investigator said that “well, I can check it for you, 
but because it’s de-identified, I will need a portion 
of your IP address to look it up.” The investigator 
was just asking for the first few digits of the IP 
address, and this person got very upset and said, “I 
did not know that XXX University was sponsoring 
this kind of survey to obtain data for free.” (P11) 
From P11’s recount, even if a researcher had concrete 
evidence of a crowd worker’s poor data input and 
wanted to cooperate to solve the issue, a crowd 
worker’s complaint could still be antagonistic and 
threatening.  
As an exception, one scholar, P20, disagreed with 
the other scholars’ choice of approving every crowd 
work regardless of their data quality. Instead, he 
critiqued the practice of unselective approval and 
unconditional payment to crowd workers irrespective 
of their data quality. P20 explained: 
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Part of the reason that the HIT approval ratio no 
longer works so well for signaling poor quality 
workers is that many researchers just approve 
everybody, whether they are mandated to by their 
IRB or because they don’t want to deal with this 
hassle at all. It’s kind of a “Tragedy of the 
Commons” where everybody, for their self-interest, 
makes the decision for just paying people and 
leaving them alone. Then collectively, it 
undermines the reputational mechanism that makes 
MTurk work. (P24) 
P24 posited that academic researchers collectively and 
interdependently rely on a reputation system, i.e., the 
approval rate system, to filter qualified crowd workers 
from unqualified ones. If every researcher decides to 
approve all crowd workers, a crowd worker’s approval 
rate will always be (fake) high, even if they are 
spamming or deceiving. Consequently, approval rates 
become inflated and meaningless to signal crowd 
workers’ accountability. P24 referred to this 
consequence as the “Tragedy of the Commons:” a 
crowd worker’s approval rate can no longer deter their 
spamming or fraud, and all the researchers would 
waste money on bad data and have to increase 
payment to solicit high-quality data.  
4.2. Ethical deliberation on research validity  
Besides data quality, our interviewees also 
deliberated the validity issues in crowd work-based 
research. Regarding internal validity, our respondents 
expressed opinions around three themes: crowd 
workers’ non-naïvety, information diffusion, and the 
undue influence of payment. First, some respondents 
were concerned about crowd workers’ non-naïvety 
due to their prior knowledge or predispositions to 
various survey questions and experimental treatments. 
For example, one scholar said that researchers should 
never run a “Prisoner’s Dilemma” on MTurk again 
because so many MTurk workers had taken it: 
I know from social science work on MTurk that 
there’s almost like a running joke. Like you can’t 
run a prisoner’s dilemma experiments on 
mechanical Turk because so many people have 
done that on MTurk. The results will be skewed 
from what the natural population would do. (P21) 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a classic game-theory 
problem about cooperation and defect. Horton et al. 
ran one of the first PD experiments on MTurk [43]. 
Most recently, Capraro et al. conducted a Stag-Hunt 
Game (SHG) experiment on MTurk, which derives 
from PD [44]. In this sense, PD related experiments 
have been tested on MTurk for over a decade.   
The majority of our respondents agreed that 
crowd workers’ non-naïvety could spoil survey 
validity and experimental manipulations. For instance, 
one scholar explained how crowd workers’ non-
naïvety could damage the internal validity of political 
research:  
Another thing on MTurk, which is to some degree 
why I stop using MTurk, is [that] people may risk 
paying too much attention because they know that 
you are evaluating their work. That doesn’t serve 
the kind of work that I do in political science, 
whereas in the real world, people are not paying 
close attention to politics, so it’s not a very 
accurate measure of what we are capturing. (P23) 
P23 noted that MTurk workers might pay too much 
attention to his questions about politics because they 
cared about their responses that researchers would 
evaluate for payment. However, such an attentive and 
meticulous attitude and behavior toward political 
questions did not resemble people’s attitudes and 
reactions to politics in the real world, which are more 
indifferent and casual. Hence, such non-naïvety was 
not helpful for his political research and partly yielded 
him to stop using MTurk. 
However, one scholar, P18, offered an opposing 
view to the other respondents. He contended that 
crowd workers’ non-naïvety could, in effect, benefit 
his privacy research: 
I and the others have been arguing for a while, that 
it’s totally OK to keep on using MTurk even in 
privacy studies, so even if a participant made a lie 
in a privacy study, because in my experience, the 
results are almost always more conservative [with 
MTurk workers] than the results that I get from the 
other samples. In other words, more conservative 
means, because the subjects may be a little less 
naïve, if I try to use a certain treatment, an 
experimental treatment, it’s harder, harder 
[emphasis his] to produce a statistically significant 
effect on MTurk samples than on non-MTurk 
samples. (P18) 
P18 argued that precisely because many MTurk 
workers were prone to be less non-naïve and more 
accustomed to various surveys and experimental 
treatments than the general public, it became harder to 
experiment with robust manipulations and obtain a 
statistically significant effect. Therefore, MTurk 
workers’ non-naïvety is beneficial for preventing Type 
I error when a researcher may falsely claim a 
significant effect in their treatments.  
Apart from non-naïvety, our respondents were 
also concerned about information diffusion that 
threatens internal validity. They noted that crowd 
workers might share research information on online 
forums outside a crowd work platform, as one IRB 
director critiqued:  
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You must make sure that they are not talking to one 
another. You must admit that limitation as well. We 
all know that mechanical Turk workers have their 
own groups that they are on all day long as they’re 
working, and they’re telling each other about the 
surveys that they’re taking. And that is a huge 
threat to internal validity. (P12) 
P12 posited that MTurk workers were diffusing 
research information with each other, which made 
some MTurk workers equipped with predisposed 
opinions or prior knowledge before participating in a 
research project. Therefore, their predisposition and 
prior knowledge became spurious factors.  
Finally, a few respondents were concerned about 
the undue influence of payment that could impair 
internal validity. For example, P31, a psychologist, 
explained the payment effect on internal validity:  
I do believe it creates a power dynamic where “I 
better say what this requester thinks or wants in 
order to get my payment. I get to do what I think the 
requester is asking for in order to just get paid” 
whereas if you are just volunteering for research, 
you don’t have that same power dynamic. (P31) 
P31 perceived that some crowd workers would 
intentionally cater their responses to a requester’s 
expectations rather than out of their real thoughts to 
get the requester’s approval and compensation. Hence, 
these crowd workers’ social desirability bias due to the 
monetary incentive would impair their research’s 
internal validity.  
In terms of external validity, multiple IRB 
directors and scholars shared their concerns about 
crowd workers’ representativeness of specific 
populations. For example, one IRB director 
highlighted the disparity between the crowd work 
population and the U.S. population regarding political 
research: 
If you are a political scientist, for example, the 
MTurk worker population is not a representative 
sample of American voters. I think MTurk workers 
are quite bimodal in age distribution. That’s like all 
people are young or old, and there is not too much 
in between. They are better educated than average 
Americans; they are probably a little bit wealthier 
than average Americans. I don’t think studies done 
on MTurk can be presented as a representative 
sample of Americans. (P17) 
Meanwhile, some also expressed concerns about the 
generalizability of the data from crowd workers, 
which is not only related to crowd workers’ 
demographics but also to the sampling challenges in 
crowd work-based research.  
Specifically, a few respondents posited that 
payment had a paradoxical effect on the sampling of 
crowd workers. They remarked that, first, an 
insufficient monetary incentive could discourage some 
crowd workers from participating, and this exclusion 
could render the research sample unrepresentative. 
Second, they speculated that if the payment was low 
or devoid, yet some crowd workers still chose to 
participate regardless, then these participants might 
not constitute the right sample either. For example, 
one scholar explained:  
There is a trade-off, and imagine we did not pay 
anybody, then the only people that would 
participate would be the people who already love 
taking political surveys, and that is not the group 
we want to know more about. We want to know 
more about people who may be not interested in 
politics. So, I think if we want to be more 
representative, we are still going to be in the 
position to compensate people. (P23) 
Besides, another scholar raised his concern about 
the statistical power in crowd work-based research. He 
regarded it hard to get a large sample for a specific 
population on MTurk, and as such, it became a more 
severe problem than a sample’s characteristics: 
It’s hard to get enough [statistical] power on 
MTurk study to do something really big like among 
“civic Republicans” because there are fewer of 
them. If I have something that I want to run among 
Republicans and I want it to break it up, 
Republicans old and young, and if I only have 200 
Republicans in my sample [on MTurk], then it’s 
basically impossible to do that analysis. (P20) 
P20 noted that if he needs to divide a sample into 
subgroups with more refined demographics, it would 
be impossible to obtain sufficient statistical power 
because those subgroups among the crowd workers are 
too small.  
Finally, one scholar stated that it is impossible to 
maintain both external validity and internal validity at 
the same time, and he would compromise the former 
for the latter in crowd work-based research:  
[F]or me, the most important goal is internal 
validity, which means that as I usually don’t say, 
“our results demonstrate that every human being 
will act the following way.” Rather, we say, “with 
this kind of sample size, and the sample of the 
population we use, we found these results, and 
because we believe that we did not have any 
confound, we stand by our result.” And then it’s the 
broader goal and mission of science to be able to 
replicate, to generalize, or to invalidate the results 
that I obtain, or the others obtain, using different 
samples. (P18) 
P18 further told us that he would constrain his sample 
of crowd workers in the U.S. for better data quality and 
internal validity because it fit his research purpose and 
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discipline better, even though it would sacrifice his 
research generalizability. 
5. Discussion  
5.1. Data quality: “Tragedy of the Commons”  
First, we agreed with P20’s concern that if every 
scholar avoided rejecting any crowd workers 
regardless of their data quality, then the data quality in 
crowd work-based research would worsen, which will 
impair all scholars’ research and funding. The 
“Tragedy of the Commons” is a phenomenon 
described and discussed by economist Garrett Hardin. 
It means that if every individual relied on themselves 
and pursued their self-interests without concerning 
their relationships with the other people or the others’ 
interests in a community, then the common resources 
would deplete and harm everyone in the end [45].  
To some degree, Hardin’s depicted phenomenon 
resembles the situation of crowd work-based research. 
Take MTurk as an example. On the one side, the 
“common resources” for all the scholars are the 
population of MTurk workers and their data input, and 
these common resources are limited. Prior research 
has estimated that the active population of MTurk 
workers for average laboratory sampling was only 
about 7,300 [46]. Even though such a number may be 
larger nowadays, the MTurk population for scholars to 
sample is arguably still quite limited. On the other 
hand, many MTurk workers have to do multiple tasks 
simultaneously to maximize their income [47]. As 
such, MTurk workers’ attention span to an individual 
task and data quality is usually short and sometimes 
careless [47,48]. In addition, scholars not only need to 
compete with each other to sample from a limited 
population of MTurk workers and win their attention 
but also must compete with non-academic requesters. 
On the other side, the “self-interest” for all the scholars 
is to gather good data from qualified MTurk workers.  
However, as previous research and our findings 
indicated, not all the MTurk workers were accountable 
or qualified to provide good quality data. Thus, it 
becomes a choice for scholars on how to pursue their 
“self-interest” in crowd work-based research. Our 
study found that most scholars would use a specific 
approval rate as a screening mechanism; nonetheless, 
they would not bother negotiating with MTurk 
workers and prefer to accept all the submissions 
regardless of data quality. Some scholars claimed that 
they did not want to waste time “fighting” with angry 
MTurk workers; some were compassionate with the 
meager income MTurk workers could obtain. But 
regardless of their rationales, we argue that if every 
scholar continues to pursue their self-interest as such, 
the limited “common resources” in crowd work-based 
research will deteriorate. Because as a result, all crowd 
workers would realize that they can be free riders in 
taking academic tasks on MTurk and get paid without 
rejection. Moreover, suppose scholars continue to 
reject no crowd worker; in that case, every crowd 
worker will likely have a fake high approval rate, 
which will be useless for scholars to filter out 
“qualified” crowd workers.  
5.2. Validity: ignored disciplinary differences   
As regards research validity, we found an 
interesting theme about disciplinary differences. P18, 
a computer scientist, argued that crowd workers’ non-
naïvety could benefit his research because it would 
make his experimental tests harder to be significant 
than with “naïve” participants. Also, unlike political 
scientists such as P20 and P23, P18 weighed more on 
the internal validity over the external validity in crowd 
work-based research. Hence, he would compromise 
crowd work-based research’s generalizability, a 
primary concern for P20 and P23, to whether his 
sample of crowd workers has few confounding factors 
and can ensure internal validity. Albeit a minority in 
our respondents, P18’s viewpoint implies that scholars 
in political science and computer science may have 
distinctive expectations and preferences of research 
validity in their respective research disciplines. 
To our knowledge, prior studies lack sufficient 
attention and discussion about research validity issues 
related to disciplinary differences in crowd work-
based research. Scholars seemed to presume that the 
validity of crowd work-based research in one 
discipline can hold and extrapolate to another 
discipline. For instance, we noticed that several 
computer scholars were citing a few political scientists’ 
early works about MTurk’s validity to support their 
research methodology (e.g., [49,50]). P18 and P23’s 
opposing views on the validity issues of crowd work-
based research reminded us that any blind reliance and 
extrapolation on the findings of validity in one 
research discipline to another could be biased or at 
least questionable. Hence, we propose that the future 
discussion about validity in crowd work-based 
research should not merely focus on a specific crowd 
work platform (e.g., whether MTurk is valid for 
scientific research generally). Instead, the discussion 
should orient at individual research disciplines (e.g., 
whether it is valid to conduct political research via 
crowd work). 
Finally, we hope to help voice IRB’s ethical 
concerns in this study. Although we knew that IRB 
usually categorizes crowd work-based research as 
exempt with minimum risks, we realized that it does 
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not necessarily mean that they favor utilizing crowd 
work for academic purposes. As our findings revealed, 
many IRB directors and analysts expressed their deep 
ethical concerns about data quality and validity issues 
in crowd work-based research. We advocate that these 
concerns should be heard by more scholars rather than 
remain in silence or within an individual institution. 
6. Conclusion  
This study investigated the data quality and 
validity issues in crowd work-based research from the 
scholars’ and IRB’s ethical perspectives. We found 
common themes about data quality issues such as 
spamming, fraud, and validity issues such as non-
naivety and information diffusion. More important, we 
identified and discussed two ethical issues in crowd 
work-based research, i.e., a potential “Tragedy of the 
Commons” due to scholars’ data quality control and 
negligence of research validity preference according 
to different disciplines. Due to the limited sample size, 
our findings may not represent the diversity of the 
scholars’ and IRBs’ views. We plan to conduct a large-
scale survey to gather more input from scholars in 
crowd work-based research and IRB directors and 
analysts in more institutions for our future work.  
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